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THE IRS’ DOUBLE-BOGEY: GOOSEN V. COMMISSIONER
REMAINS A FAIRWAY TO CHARACTERIZE
ENDORSEMENT INCOME FOR
NONRESIDENT ALIEN ATHLETES
IN GARCIA V. COMMISSIONER
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last several decades, endorsements of professional
athletes have risen substantially.1  Although endorsements often do
not fuel sales, much of their value comes in the form of better prod-
uct recall with consumers.2  As a result, larger companies are often
willing to spend large sums of money to align themselves with ath-
letes whom they feel best represent their target brand and can help
them reach a wide-ranging audience.3  In the cases of athletes such
as David Beckham, Tiger Woods, and LeBron James, lifetime earn-
ings far exceed $100 million.4
As of 2010, one of the largest endorsers of professional ath-
letes, Nike Inc., had approximately $3.8 billion in outstanding long-
term endorsement obligations.5  Such endorsement deals typically
fall into one of two types of licensing agreements: (1) the athlete
granting the rights to his or her identity; or (2) the athlete agreeing
to develop products associated with him or her, or with his or her
1. See Sarah Jane Gilbert, Marketing Maria: Managing the Athlete Endorsement,
HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL (Oct. 29, 2007), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/5607.
html (summarizing rise of athlete endorsements).
2. See Kevin YC Chung, Timothy P. Derdenger & Kannan Srinivasan, Economic
Value of Celebrity Endorsements: Tiger Woods’ Impact on Sales of Nike Golf Balls, CARNEGIE
MELLON UNIVERSITY COMPUTING SERVICES (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.andrew.
cmu.edu/user/derdenge/CelebrityEndorsements.pdf (explaining benefits of ce-
lebrity endorsement).
3. See Gilbert, supra note 1 (discussing willingness of companies to spend R
large sums of money on endorsements).
4. See Jeanne Rose, Five of the Biggest Athlete Endorsement Deals, YAHOO! SPORTS
(Feb. 27, 2012), http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/news?slug=ycn-11011486 (explor-
ing larger endorsement deals in history).
5. See Daniel Kaplan, Nike Endorsement Tab Swooshes Down, STREET & SMITH’S
SPORTSBUSINESS JOURNAL (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/
Journal/Issues/2010/08/20100802/This-Weeks-News/Nike-Endorsement-Tab-
Swooshes-Down.aspx (establishing Nike’s outstanding long-term endorsement
obligations).
(605)
1
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sport.6  Nevertheless, sometimes endorsement deals encompass ele-
ments of both, with obligations varying by the specific deal.7
With the growing size of athlete endorsements, options are
emerging to address the tax implications of such earnings.8  In the
case of taxation of nonresident foreign-nationals relating to busi-
ness in the U.S, however, there have been several classification is-
sues concerning the type of income under such arrangements.9
This issue ultimately surfaced in the context of a professional ath-
lete with worldwide endorsements, where the United States Tax
Court was forced to address the character and source of such in-
come for the purposes of United States taxation.10  Despite this de-
cision, the issue recently resurfaced before the Tax Court once
again as professional athletes continue to challenge the method of
determining the character and source of income for the purposes
of their United States tax liability due to the significant amount of
money routinely at stake.11
Section II of this comment will discuss the relevant tax code
provisions and regulations that apply when nonresident foreign
athletes earn endorsement income that creates U.S. tax liabilities.12
Sections III and IV will trace the development of relevant jurispru-
dence, up through Goosen, in determining whether worldwide en-
dorsement income is classified as personal services income or
endorsement income.13  Section V will then analyze the Tax Court’s
methodology in Goosen, argue the need for a balance between the
ability to promote domestic events and the ability to adequately col-
6. See Daniel Auerbach, Morals Clauses as Corporate Protection in Athlete Endorse-
ment Contracts, 3 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1-2 (2005) (stating
common types of athlete endorsements).
7. See Chung et al., supra note 2 (describing Tiger Wood’s contract with Nike R
involving endorsement and use of equipment).
8. See Robert W. Wood, And Now For Olympic Endorsement Deals . . ., FORBES
(Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2012/08/12/and-now-
for-olympic-endorsement-deals/ (describing rolling endorsement income into an-
nuities option to flatten earnings and reduce tax liabilities).
9. For a discussion on previous issues regarding the taxation of nonresident
aliens U.S. business income, see infra notes 41 – 76 and accompanying text. R
10. See Goosen v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 547, 548-69 (2011) (analyzing en-
dorsement income of professional golfer for character, source, and connection
with trade or business in determining tax consequences).
11. For a discussion about Sergio Garcia’s recent case before the Tax Court,
see infra notes 171 - 193 and accompanying text. R
12. For a discussion regarding the applicable tax code provisions and regula-
tions relating to the taxation of nonresident aliens’ endorsement income, see infra
notes 16 - 40 and accompanying text. R
13. For a discussion tracing the development of jurisprudence pertaining to
the taxation of nonresident alien athletes and entertainers, see infra notes 41 - 120 R
and accompanying text.
2
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lect tax on income earned in the United States, and explore related
issues that came up in the 2012 London Olympic Games.14  Finally,
section VI will examine the Tax Court’s recent Garcia decision, and
the degree to which it conformed to the precedent set forth in
Goosen.15
II. BACKGROUND ON TAXATION OF NONRESIDENT ALIENS
A variety of factors come into play when examining the U.S. tax
liabilities of a nonresident alien; however, one must begin with de-
termining that the income is U.S-sourced, as the United States gen-
erally taxes only U.S.-sourced income for such individuals.16
Although the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) does not provide gui-
dance for sourcing every specific type of income, it expressly sets
forth sourcing rules for classifying types of income as from U.S.
sources, sources outside the United States, and/or income to be
prorated between the two.17  Nonetheless, income from sources
outside the United States is rarely tax exempt under specific
circumstances.18
Specifically, as relevant to the forthcoming discussion on pro-
fessional golfers, IRC section 861(a)(3) states that compensation
for personal services performed inside the United States shall be
deemed U.S.-sourced.19  However, it excludes income from per-
sonal services in the United States if performed by nonresident
aliens in the United States for less than a total of ninety days, for
compensation less than $3,000, and for compensation received for
performance as an employee or under contract with a foreign entity
not engaged in business with the United States, or with a domestic
corporation if the services are performed abroad.20  Although non-
resident alien professional athletes are generally under contract
14. For a discussion on the impact of Goosen and this area of law moving for-
ward, see infra notes 121 - 193 and accompanying text. R
15. For an examination of the Tax Court’s most recent guidance on endorse-
ment income, see infra notes 121 - 193 and accompanying text. R
16. See generally I.R.C. §§ 861-863 (2006) (establishing framework for taxing
nonresident aliens).
17. See id. (setting forth rules for classifying type and source of income).
18. See id. § 864(c)(4) (describing reverse-sourcing rule where foreign
sourced income is deemed effectively connected with U.S. trade or business with
U.S. office or fixed place of business).
19. See id. § 861(a)(3) (stating that compensation for personal services per-
formed in the U.S. is U.S.-sourced income); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.861-4 (2005)
(providing more specific guidance for sourcing personal services performed inside
U.S.).
20. See I.R.C. § 861(a)(3) (stating criterion for income not deemed from
sources within United States).
3
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with foreign management companies, this exception generally does
not apply if their compensation exceeds the threshold.21  Further,
section 862(a)(3) establishes that any compensation for all per-
sonal services performed outside the United States shall not be
U.S.-sourced.22
Similarly, IRC section 861(a)(4) declares that rents and royal-
ties from use of intellectual property in the U.S. is U.S-sourced.23
However, section 862(a)(4) of the IRC states that “rentals or royal-
ties from . . . any interest in . . . property, including rentals or royal-
ties for the use of or for the privilege of using without the United
States patents, copyrights, secret processes and formulas, good will,
trade-marks, trade brands, franchises, and other like properties”
shall be treated as income from outside the United States.24  The
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), in Revenue Ruling 68-443, has pro-
vided additional guidance on the taxation of royalties derived from
intellectual property.25 Revenue Ruling 68-443 bolsters the conclu-
sion that royalties or use of a foreign trademark on products that
are ultimately used in foreign countries are income from sources
without the United States, despite any initial sale of the items being
inside the United States.26
Next, to determine the tax liability for a nonresident alien, an
assessment as to whether they are engaged in a U.S. trade or busi-
21. See, e.g., Andrew Mitchel, Golfer Endorsement Fees: Part Royalties & Part Ser-
vices, Part U.S. Source & Part Foreign Source, ANDREWMITCHEL.COM (2011), http://
www.andrewmitchel.com/charts/goosen.pdf (discussing structure of athlete’s in-
come through management subsidiary); M.L. Rose, The Average Salary of Men Pro
Golfers, GOLFSMITH, http://golftips.golfsmith.com/average-salary-men-pro-golfers-2
0330.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012) (putting forth average compensation for golf
tournament).
22. See I.R.C. § 862(a)(3) (2006) (announcing “compensation for labor or
personal services performed without the United States” shall be treated as gross
income without United States).
23. See id. § 861(a)(4) (stating income without United States includes “rentals
or royalties from property located without the United States or from any interest in
such property, including rentals or royalties for the use of or for the privilege of
using without the United States patents, copyrights, secret processes and formulas,
good will, trade-marks, trade brands, franchises, and other like properties”); see also
Treas. Reg. § 1.861-5 (1975) (providing further guidance on royalties attributable
to United States as source).
24. See I.R.C. § 862(a)(4) (quoting statute on sourcing rents and royalties to
outside United States); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.862-1 (1983) (detailing further in-
struction on royalties sourced to outside United States).
25. See Rev. Rul. 68-443, 1968-2 C.B. 304 (1968) (“Royalties for the use of a
foreign trademark on products that are ultimately used in foreign countries are
income from sources without the United States even though the initial sale of the
articles took place in the United States.”).
26. See id. (concluding source of royalty income to be from end-use location).
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ness is required.27  The IRC provides slim guidance as to the exact
definition of a U.S. trade or business.28  It appears that the determi-
nation is fact-driven and is subject to a case-by-case analysis; how-
ever, the performance of personal services in the United States by a
nonresident alien is deemed a U.S. trade or business.29  Moreover,
Rev. Rul. 70-543 used a relevant example:
B, a professional golfer, is a nonresident alien individual
who enters various professional golfing tournaments in
the United States during the taxable year. . . .  The
amounts received by B during the year as prizes for partici-
pation in various golfing tournaments are compensation
for personal services as a self-employed nonresident alien
individual.30
If the nonresident alien is deemed to be engaged in a U.S trade or
business, the inquiry turns to whether the alien has any income that
is “effectively connected” with his U.S. trade or business.31  Gener-
ally, a nonresident alien with a U.S. trade or business will have all its
U.S.-sourced income “effectively connected” to that U.S. business.32
As a result, such income would be taxed at the graduated rates, per
section 871(b) of the IRC.33  If the nonresident alien’s income is
not “effectively connected,” it is subject to taxation in the United
States only if it is U.S.-sourced income and if it meets other tests.34
For cases of so-called “fixed or determinable annual or periodi-
cal gains, profits, and income” (“FDAP”), if U.S.-sourced, then this
income is “effectively connected” with a trade or business, as long as
it qualifies under either the business activities test or the asset use
test.35  Such FDAP income explicitly includes interest, dividends,
27. See I.R.C. § 864(b) (defining U.S. trade or business); see also Treas. Reg.
1.864-2 (1975) (clarifying definition of trade or business).
28. See I.R.C. § 864(b) (describing ambiguity in definition of U.S. trade or
business).
29. See Rev. Rul. 70-543, 1970-2 C.B. 172 (stating personal services in the
United States is U.S. trade or business).
30. See id. (quoting IRS Revenue Ruling Scenario 2).
31. See I.R.C. § 864(c)(3) (defining term “effectively connected” income).
32. See id. (describing scenarios when income is treated as effectively con-
nected with conduct of a trade or business with the United States by a nonresident
alien individual).
33. See id. § 871(b) (subjecting income connected with U.S. business to gradu-
ated rate of tax).
34. See id. §§ 871(a)(1)-(a)(2) (setting forth types of non-”effectively con-
nected” income that is taxed by United States).
35. See id. § 864(c)(2) (establishing tests for FDAP and capital gains income
to qualify as “effectively connected”).
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rents, salaries, wages, rents, and royalties, among other items of in-
come.36  The assets use test asks whether “the income, gain, or loss
is derived from assets used in or held for use in the conduct of such
trade or business.”37  The business activities test inquires whether
“the activities of such trade or business were a material factor in the
realization of the income, gain, or loss.”38  However, if the U.S-
sourced FDAP fails to meet either test, it will not be considered
“effectively connected” to the U.S. business, and consequently, it
will be taxed under the thirty percent rate required by section
871(a) of the IRC.39  Moreover, specific FDAP income, such as roy-
alties on intangible property, is often either reduced from the thirty
percent rate by treaties that lower rates or is abolished altogether.40
III. EARLIER GUIDANCE
A. United States v. Johansson41
In United States v. Johansson, one of the court’s earliest efforts at
tackling the issue of royalties for nonresident alien professional ath-
letes, a taxpayer contested royalties stemming from a boxing
match.42  Ingemar Johansson, a citizen of Sweden, received com-
pensation for a boxing match against Floyd Patterson in 1960 and
1961, including percentages of receipts from movie, radio, and tele-
vision rights to the fights in which he participated.43  The United
States District Court in the Southern District of Florida found that
the compensation Johansson received should not be considered
royalties within the framework of the international tax treaties rele-
vant to Mr. Johansson.44  In doing so, the court specifically noted:
36. See Internal Revenue Service, Fixed, Determinable, Annual, Periodical (FDAP) In-
come, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Fixed,-Deter-
minable,-Annual,-Periodical-(FDAP)-Income (last updated Aug. 2, 2012) (listing
items that are examples of FDAP income, including royalties).
37. See I.R.C. § 864(c)(2)(A) (stating assets use test for U.S.-sourced FDP and
capital gains income to be effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business).
38. See id. § 864(c)(2)(B) (imposing business activities test for U.S-sourced
FDP and capital gains income to be effectively connected with a U.S. trade or
business).
39. See id. § 871(a) (declaring 30% tax rate for types of income not qualifying
as “effectively connected”).
40. See, e.g., Double Taxation: Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, U.S.-U.K.,
art. IV, ¶ 1(a)(i), Dec. 31, 1975, 31 U.S.T. 5668 (stating that United Kingdom will
tax nonresident U.K. citizens on non-U.K. sourced income only to extent that such
income enters U.K.).
41. 8 A.F.T.R.2d 6001 (S.D. Fla. 1961), aff’d, 336 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1964).
42. See id. (summarizing circumstances of case).
43. See id. (describing plaintiff contesting tax liabilities).
44. See id. (“No part of the compensation received by Ingemar Johansson dur-
ing the involved periods from the television rights, movie rights, and radio
6
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Ingemar Johansson did not have any proprietary interest
in any of the non-Scandinavian radio rights, television
rights, or movie rights to the fights of June 26, 1959, June
20, 1960, or March 13, 1961.  The use of the amounts re-
ceived from these non-Scandinavian movie, radio, and tel-
evision rights to the involved fights in the computation of
Ingemar Johansson’s compensation from those fights was
but the method of computing Ingemar Johansson’s per-
sonal service income for his appearance in those fights,
which had been agreed upon by Ingemar Johansson and
the promoter of those fights.45
As such, it was merely a basis for compensation without any
real ownership rights in the property.46  As a result, the court re-
fused to deem such income “royalties” within the terms of the treaty
in question.47
B. Kramer v. Commissioner48
Prior to Goosen, Kramer v. Commissioner was the primary author-
ity relied upon for characterizing endorsement income.49  Kramer,
a former amateur and professional tennis champion, was paid royal-
ties by the Wilson Sporting Goods Company in 1975 and 1976 from
the sale of tennis equipment.50  Kramer’s contract also required
that he make promotional appearances and participate in activities
for Wilson.51  Based on Kramer’s activities in connection with his
contract with Wilson, the Commissioner found deficiencies in
Kramer’s taxes and challenged the amounts received by Kramer as
“earned income” for the years in question.52
rights . . . was royalties within the meaning of the Tax Convention existing between
the United States and Switzerland or within the meaning of the Tax Convention
existing between the United States and Sweden.”).
45. See id. (stressing petitioner maintained no ownership of movie, radio, or
television rights).
46. See id. (describing court’s holding).
47. See id. (discussing ultimate outcome of case).
48. 80 T.C. 768 (1983).
49. See Tony Nitti, Tax Court Determines Character, Source of Golfer’s Worldwide
Endorsement Income, THE TAX ADVISOR (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.aicpa.org/publi-
cations/taxadviser/2011/september/pages/taxtrends_sep2011.aspx (declaring
primary authority for characterizing income prior to Goosen was Kramer).
50. See Kramer, 80 T.C. at 769-70 (describing facts surrounding case).
51. See id. at 771-72 (summarizing obligations under endorsement
agreement).
52. See id. at 769 (describing central issue of case).
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Kramer was actively involved in being a liaison to the sport and
was required to make appearances separate from his Wilson obliga-
tions.53  The court determined, despite Wilson’s obvious benefit
from Kramer’s travel and appearances in its sale of “Jack Kramer”
racquets, that “the bulk of [Kramer]’s tennis-related travel was not
directly connected with Wilson, or . . . requested by [Wilson.]”54
Relying on this point, the court held that the royalties were paid
primarily in exchange for the right to use Kramer’s name and like-
ness exclusively and only secondarily for the personal services per-
formed by him.55  As a result, the court determined the
endorsement income in question was properly allocated as seventy
percent royalties income and thirty percent income derived from
personal services.56
C. Boulez v. Commissioner57
Similar to Johansson and Kramer, the Tax Court in Boulez built
upon the aforementioned principles when determining whether
certain payments from a contract were royalties or compensation in
consideration of personal services for the purposes of international
taxation.58  Pierre Boulez, a citizen of France and resident of Ger-
many, was a world-renowned music director and orchestra conduc-
tor.59  Boulez had entered into a contract with CBS Records to
produce recordings of orchestral works, some of which would be in
the United States.60  It specified that the recordings would remain
the property of CBS, who would then pay Boulez a percentage of its
sales.61
Boulez maintained that the payments he received from CBS
were not taxable by the United States because they were royalties
within the meaning of the applicable treaty between the U.S. and
53. See id. at 772-75 (establishing Kramer’s travel schedule for commitments
both for Wilson as well as other engagements).
54. See id. at 775 (describing conclusions drawn by court regarding Kramer’s
travel schedule).
55. See id. at 781 (“In our judgment these royalties were primarily for the
grant of the right to use petitioner’s name, facsimile signature, etc., and only sec-
ondarily for services that petitioner was required to render under the contract.”).
56. See id. at 781-82 (finding that determination of allocation made by Kramer
was appropriate).
57. 83 T.C. 584 (1984).
58. See id. at 584 (setting forth issue to be decided by court).
59. See id. at 584-85 (describing plaintiff’s citizenship, residency, and employ-
ment details).
60. See id. (stating facts relevant to characterizing and sourcing plaintiff’s
income).
61. See id. at 586 (defining terms of contract).
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Germany.62  In opposition, the IRS argued that the payments in
question were taxable to Boulez by the United States because they
represented compensation for personal services performed in the
United States by the petitioner.63
The court looked to whether Boulez licensed or conveyed a
property interest in the recordings to CBS that he was contracted to
make to CBS, and whether he received actual royalties in return.64
The court acknowledged that the contract consistently refers to the
compensation to Boulez as royalties, and that the payments were
tied directly to the proceeds from sales of the recordings.65  How-
ever, the court found that the contract between Boulez and CBS
was “replete with language indicating that what was intended . . .
was a contract for personal services.”66  Additionally, it was agreed
that the recordings would be entirely the property of CBS, and
there was no language indicating a licensing of a purported right or
a copyright within the agreement.67
Further, in evaluating whether Boulez maintained a property
interest that he could license or sell, the court determined that the
applicable treaty was not explicit and was forced to remit to U.S. law
to make a determination.68  Resting upon case law, the court stated
that “the existence of a property right in the payee is fundamental
for the purpose of determining whether royalty income exists, and
this is equally true under our domestic law as well as under the
treaty.”69  Because Boulez did not maintain any property rights in
the recordings he made for CBS Records, the court determined he
could neither license nor sell the recordings, and consequently,
could not earn any royalty income.70  Therefore, the Tax Court
concluded that the payments to Boulez should not be classified as
royalties, but instead as personal services income under the applica-
ble treaty.71
62. See id. at 589 (characterizing petitioner’s argument before court).
63. See id. (setting forth position of Internal Revenue Service).
64. See id. at 591-95 (recounting court’s progression of analysis).
65. See id. at 591-93 (summarizing court’s findings supporting royalties
argument).
66. See id. at 592 (describing facts supporting personal services income
argument).
67. See id. (detailing ownership agreement of recordings in contract).
68. See id. at 591 (outlining that treaty was inadequate to answer question of
law).
69. See id.
70. See id. (concluding that lack of property interest prohibited any license
agreement giving rise to royalty income).
71. See id. (ruling that payments to petitioner qualify as personal services
income).
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D. Other Prior Guidance
In 1994, the IRS included a chapter titled “Characterization of
Income for Professional Tennis Players” in its publication Market
Segment Specialization Training Guide.72  In it, the IRS stated that the
“characterization of endorsement income is not clear cut” and that
it is very fact-dependent.73  Nevertheless, the IRS advised its examin-
ers to approach the characterization of on-court endorsement in-
come aggressively, relying on the fact that it had successfully made
the argument that all endorsement income is personal service in-
come since an athlete was required to play in tournaments to re-
ceive the income.74
In 2009, the IRS Chief Counsel provided general legal gui-
dance concerning what constitutes endorsement income.75  In AM
2009-005, the Associate Chief Counsel addressed the characteriza-
tion of U.S.-sourced ranking and placement bonuses paid, pursuant
to on-course endorsement contracts, to nonresident aliens under
the IRC.76  Once again, the Chief Counsel took the position that all
on-course endorsement income should be treated as personal ser-
vices income.77
IV. GOOSEN V. COMMISSIONER
In Goosen v. Commissioner, the Tax Court examined specific tax-
ation issues concerning a professional golfer’s international en-
dorsement deals.78  Retief Goosen, a nonresident alien and
professional golfer, petitioned the Tax Court for redetermination
of income tax deficiencies that arose from international endorse-
ment deals.79  Goosen, a citizen of South Africa and resident of the
United Kingdom, had entered into endorsement agreements with
72. See Nitti, supra note 49 (describing IRS publication relating to characteri- R
zation of income for tennis players).
73. See id. (stating position of IRS advisement in its training guide).
74. See id. (describing IRS advisement to examiners to aggressively pursue en-
dorsement income on successful precedent that all on-course endorsement in-
come is essentially personal services income).
75. See Memorandum from Steven A. Musher, Associate Chief Counsel to the
Internal Revenue Service on  U.S. Source Retainer Fees and Ranking and Place-
ment Bonuses Derived by Professional Golf and Tennis Players from On-Court En-
dorsement Contracts (June 26, 2009), available at IRS AM 2009-005, 2009 WL
2009043 (providing input on matter from IRS Chief Counsel).
76. See id. (characterizing general content of memorandum).
77. See id. (stating position of IRS Chief Counsel).
78. See 136 T.C. 547, 548-69 (2011) (examining character and source of in-
come earned by nonresident alien professional golfer).
79. See id. at 548-49 (explaining basis for case).
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sponsors such as Acushnet, TaylorMade, Izod, Upper Deck, Elec-
tronic Arts, and Rolex, which allowed the use of his name, face,
image, and likeness in advertising and marketing campaigns glob-
ally.80  Each of the endorsement agreements paid Goosen a base
endorsement fee; however, while several sponsors prorated the fee
if he did not play in a required number of golf tournaments, others
instead provided bonuses for top finishes or a notable World Golf
Ranking.81
When filing his 2002 and 2003 United States federal income
tax returns, Goosen determined the endorsement fees and bonuses
from Acushnet, TaylorMade, and Izod consisted of half royalty in-
come and half personal services income.82  Additionally, he deter-
mined the endorsement fees from Upper Deck, Electronic Arts,
and Rolex entirely consisted of royalty income.83  Moreover,
Goosen reported that around seven percent of his endorsement in-
come was U.S.-sourced income.84
Conversely, the IRS determined that Goosen should have cate-
gorized the totality of the endorsement fees and bonuses from
Acushnet, Taylormade, and Izod as personal services income.85  Ad-
ditionally, the IRS increased the amount of Goosen’s endorsement
fees specifically allocated as U.S.-sourced income.86
The Tax Court ultimately found that the endorsement fees and
bonuses that Goosen received from Acushnet, Taylormade, and
Izod was fifty percent personal services income and 50 percent roy-
alty income.87  Additionally, the court held that the royalty income
from Acushnet, Taylormade, and Izod were 50 percent U.S.-
sourced income effectively connected with U.S. business.88  Fur-
80. See id. at 547-48 (discussing petitioner’s citizenship, residency, and en-
dorsement contracts).
81. See id. at 547 (summarizing terms of endorsement contracts).
82. See id. (paraphrasing Goosen’s determination on personal services and
royalty income amounts).
83. See id. (describing Goosen’s returns for 2002 and 2003).
84. See id. (outlining amount of Goosen’s endorsement reported as U.S.-
sourced).
85. See id. (boiling down Internal Revenue Service’s position and
determinations).
86. See id. (discussing findings of IRS).
87. For a further discussion on the allocation of personal services versus roy-
alty income, see supra notes 16-40 and accompanying text.  For a further discussion R
on the court’s characterization of income in Goosen, see infra notes 90-96 and ac- R
companying text.
88. For a further discussion on the determination of U.S.-sourced income, see
supra notes 16-40 and accompanying text.  For a further discussion regarding the R
court’s determination of U.S.-sourced income in Goosen, see infra notes 97-109 and R
accompanying text.
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ther, royalties Goosen received from Rolex were determined to be
half U.S.-sourced income not effectively connected with a U.S.
trade or business, royalties received from Upper Deck were deter-
mined to be ninety-two percent U.S.-sourced income not effectively
connected with a U.S. trade or business, and royalties received from
Electronic Arts were determined to be seventy percent U.S.-sourced
income not effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business.89
This comment will now examine the court’s determinations on
each matter.
A. Character of Income
In examining the character of income for Goosen’s various en-
dorsement deals, the court first noted that the parties agreed that
all endorsement fees under off-course endorsement agreements
constitute royalty income.90  In light of that, the only contested in-
come was derived from the on-course endorsement agreements
from TaylorMade, Izod and Acushnet.91  On this issue, Goosen pri-
marily relied on Boulez v. Commissioner to bolster his argument in
favor of royalties as he maintains an ownership interest in his name
and likeness.92  The IRS argued that the sponsors primarily paid the
petitioner to perform personal services, as the required services in-
cluded playing golf and carrying or wearing the sponsor’s
merchandise.93
In reaching its decision, the court stated that the “characteriza-
tion of the petitioner’s on-course endorsement fees and bonuses
depends on whether the sponsors primarily paid for petitioner’s
services, for the use of the petitioner’s name and likeness, or for
both.”94  In examining the record, the court found that the en-
dorsement agreements granted the sponsors the right to use
Goosen’s name and likeness for advertising, required him to wear
or use the sponsors’ products and make promotional appearances,
89. For a further discussion on the determination of U.S.-sourced income
connected to a trade or business, see supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text. R
For a further discussion on the court’s determination of effectively connected in-
come, see infra notes 110-120 and accompanying text. R
90. See Goosen, 136 T.C. at 560 (describing stipulation by both parties that off-
course endorsement agreements constitute royalties).
91. See id. (setting forth remaining area of contention between parties).
92. For a further discussion on Boulez v. Commissioner, see supra notes 57-71 R
and accompanying text.
93. See Goosen, 136 T.C. at 560 (“Respondent argues that the personal services
petitioner was required to perform included playing golf and carrying or wearing
the sponsors’ products.”).
94. See id. (quoting opinion of court).
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paid him tournament and ranking bonuses for his on-course per-
formance, and failed to allocate the endorsement income between
personal services and royalties.95  Despite the difficulty in allocating
the endorsement fees between performance of services and use of
name or likeness the court estimated both were equally important,
and allocated each 50 percent of the fees.96
B. Source of Income
In turning to the source of the income, the court accepted the
stipulation sourcing the personal services income, tournament bo-
nuses, and ranking bonuses to the United States.97  Nevertheless,
the parties disagreed on what portion of royalty income from on-
course and off-course endorsement fees should be U.S.-sourced in-
come.98  In sourcing intangibles, the court referenced sections
861(a)(4) and 862(a)(4) of the IRC for sourcing intangible prop-
erty, which require sourcing it where it is used or granted the privi-
lege of being used.99  The court then proceeded to examine where
Goosen’s name and likeness were used, or would be used, to deter-
mine the actual U.S.-sourced amount.100
The court stated that taxpayers must make an appropriate
sourcing allocation if the royalties relate to the right and use of the
property within the United States.101  Courts have been known to
allocate all royalty income to the United States in the absence of a
reasonable allocation, unless a sufficient basis exists for allocating
the income otherwise.102  Here, Goosen and his endorsers agreed
to source twenty-five percent of his income to the United Kingdom,
and seventy-five percent to the rest of the world—failing to specifi-
cally allocate income to the United States.103
95. See id. (discussing court’s findings in regards to personal services income
and royalties income).
96. See id. (stating court’s allocation of income between personal services and
royalties).
97. See id. at 563 (describing court’s treatment of personal services income
sourced to United States).
98. See id. (describing remaining issue of sourcing royalties income).
99. For a further discussion on §§ 861 and 862, see notes supra 16–24 and R
accompanying text.
100. See Goosen, 136 T.C. at 563 (examining where name and likeness were
used by looking at sales figures).
101. See id. at 564 (discussing standards for sourcing royalty income).
102. See id. (summarizing courts’ previous approaches to unreasonable alloca-
tion of royalty income).
103. See id. (recounting petitioner’s sourcing).
13
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As a result, the court proceeded to evaluate the petitioner’s
name and likeness in the context of each endorsement deal.104  In
reaching its decision regarding each company’s endorsement deal,
the court searched the record for evidence of sales and usage of
names and likeness.105  Despite noting that product sales do not
necessarily reflect relative worldwide value of intangible rights, the
court found that the petitioner’s name and likeness added value to
both Upper Deck’s and Electronic Arts’ sales, and sourced to the
U.S. at the same percent of these companies’ U.S. sales.106  Simi-
larly, the court found it “perplexing . . . that [Goosen] allocated . . .
only 6.4 percent of his royalty income to the United States[,]” de-
spite testifying that the U.S. is one of his three largest markets.107
Looking at the rest of the facts, the court recognized the peti-
tioner’s demonstration of his global image, and while acknowledg-
ing the United States to be his largest market, the court stated it was
unreasonable to source all royalties to the United States.108  As a
result, taking into account the entirety of the evidence, the court
sourced fifty percent of royalties from Rolex to the United States.109
C. Effectively Connected Income
Finally, the court turned to the issue of whether the U.S.-
sourced income is effectively connected with a U.S. trade or busi-
ness.110  The parties agreed that Goosen engaged in the U.S. trade
or business of playing golf.111  As mentioned earlier, U.S.-sourced
income effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business subjects
the nonresident alien to the graduated tax rates applicable to U.S.
residents; non U.S.-sourced income not effectively connected with a
trade or business (i.e. royalties and other FDAP) is subject to a flat
thirty percent withholding tax.112
104. See id. (describing court’s opinion).
105. See id. at 564-66 (accounting for court’s examination of record).
106. See id. at 564-65 (reconciling analysis of court).
107. See id. at 565-66 (discussing areas of concern found by court in examin-
ing petitioner’s allocation of royalty income to United States).
108. See id. at 566 (setting forth reasoning of court in sourcing petitioner’s
image to United States.)
109. See id. (sourcing half of royalties from Rolex to United States after
inquiry).
110. See id. (tracing analysis of court that ends with effectively connected
prong of analysis).
111. See id. (setting forth petitioner’s trade or business for purposes of
analysis).
112. See id. (describing rates applicable to effectively connected and non-ef-
fectively connected income).
14
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol20/iss2/9
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-2\VLS209.txt unknown Seq: 15 14-JUN-13 14:46
2013] THE IRS DOUBLE-BOGEY 619
As Goosen did not maintain a place of business in the U.S., he
is not subject to U.S. tax on income from non-U.S. sources.113
Moreover, the parties did not dispute that the petitioner’s golf play
constituted personal services and was appropriately taxed at the
graduated rates.114  Nevertheless, the court still had to determine
whether Goosen’s U.S.-sourced royalty income was effectively con-
nected with his U.S. trade or business.115
In determining whether U.S.-sourced royalty income is effec-
tively connected with a U.S. trade or business, the activities of the
trade or business must be a material factor in realizing the royalty
income.116  The court separately considered the U.S.-sourced roy-
alty income received from the on-course and off-course endorse-
ments in conducting its analysis.117  In the former, the court
reasoned that petitioner’s participation in a golf tournament was
material to receiving the income for the use of his name and like-
ness.118  As a result, it found that such income was effectively con-
nected with a U.S. trade or business, and thus was subject to the
graduated tax rates.119  Conversely, since the off-course endorse-
ments required no play or tournament victories, nor did they re-
quire petitioner to be physically present in the United States, the
court deemed the associated income as not effectively connected
with a U.S. trade or business, and thus was subject to the flat thirty
percent tax on the gross income of such endorsements.120
V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
A. Generally
The issue of nonresident alien professional athletes being
taxed on their worldwide endorsement income in the United States
113. See id. (stating petitioner’s income from non-U.S. sources not subject to
U.S. tax).
114. See id. at 566-67 (discussing petitioner’s acquiescence to taxes on income
directly resulting from golf play).
115. See id. at 567 (noting court’s need to determine whether royalty income
was effectively connected to U.S. trade or business).
116. For a further discussion on determining if U.S.-sourced royalty income is
connected with a trade or business, see supra notes 16 - 40 and accompanying text. R
117. See Goosen, 136 T.C. at 567 (noting how court conducted its evaluation).
118. See id. (deciding petitioner’s golf play was required for such income).
119. See id. (concluding on-course income effectively connected to U.S. trade
or business).
120. See id. at 567 (reasoning off-course income required no play element and
thus was not effectively connected).
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has recently increased.121 Goosen has provided both practitioners,
and athletes clarifying guidance on the treatment of international
endorsement contracts for athletes competing in events both within
the United States and abroad.122  Despite such guidance, many still
do not agree with the Court’s and the IR’s position and characteri-
zation of income, and others subsequently raised issues that appear
to remain unanswered.123
In evaluating the Goosen decision, commentators expressed
concern for how the court sourced royalty income for the purposes
of endorsement contracts.124  Specifically, one commentator stated:
The aspect of the decision that seems to have scared some
practitioners (other than the existence of a worldwide
market of collectible golf cards, which maybe scares only
this practitioner) was how the court sourced royalty in-
come according to the U.S.-to-worldwide sales percent-
ages.  The fear is that the IRS will simply apply those
percentages in every case, and taxpayers will have no room
to negotiate a more favorable allocation.125
For Goosen, the direct result of such methodology increased his
U.S.-sourced royalty income from deals with Upper Deck by 83%
and Electronic Arts by 62%, thereby increasing his tax liability.126
In addition, this precedent leaves an uphill battle for athletes to
overcome in contesting future sourced income.127
Additionally, Goosen raises a subsequent concern through its in-
consistent methodology for characterizing and sourcing Goosen’s
121. See Peter Finch, Turbo-Taxing The Tour Pros, GOLFDIGEST (Apr. 2011)
(“[W]hat’s becoming much more of an issue these days is golfers’ endorsement
income.”).
122. See Nitti, supra note 49 (“The Tax Court’s decision in Goosen provides R
nonresident professional athletes with long-awaited authority for determining the
character and source of their worldwide endorsement income.”).
123. For a further discussion regarding the impact and criticisms of Goosen,
see infra notes 124–137 and accompanying text. R
124. See Steve Dixon, Tax Court Addresses Character and Sourcing Issues for Golfer’s
Endorsement Income, TAX APPELLATE BLOG (Nov. 1, 2011), http://appellatetax.com/
2011/11/01/tax-court-addresses-character-and-sourcing-issues-for-golfer%E2%80
%99s-endorsement-income/ (discussing apprehension for court’s method in
sourcing royalty income).
125. See id. (quoting author, Steve Dixon).
126. See Nitti, supra note 49 (“[T]he sourcing of off-course royalty income R
according to the sales of the underlying product increased Goosen’s tax liability,
raising his U.S.-source royalty income from contracts with Upper Deck and Elec-
tronic Arts by 83% and 62%, respectively.”).
127. See id. (“This sourcing methodology becomes a precedent that will be
difficult for athletes to overcome in future decisions.”).
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on-course royalty income related to Rolex.128  One critic stated,
“[i]t is curious that the court chose to use an estimated allocation
[for the Rolex endorsement] amount rather than to employ the
same approach used in sourcing Upper Deck and Electronic Arts
income.”129  Another commented:
I was surprised at the informal manner [sic] in which the
Tax Court “guessed” at several key allocations, including
splitting the on-course endorsement income 50/50 be-
tween royalty income and personal service income, then
again in sourcing the royalty income 50% to the U.S.
Both amounts were completely arbitrary, with no quantita-
tive analysis performed.130
Nonetheless, uncertainty appears to linger as it is unclear why some
allocations were sometimes based on sales figures, while others
were left to a simple estimation by the court.131  Moreover, specula-
tion remains as to whether the result would have been the same
had Goosen been ranked 150 on the money list instead of within
the top ten, or whether his failure to win a major tournament
would have had any impact.132  Similarly, it is unclear whether the
outcome would have changed if Goosen were a hero in his home
country but unknown in the US—thus, laying the foundation for an
inequitable outcome.133
Finally, in approaching the taxation of nonresident alien pro-
fessional athletes, one must be mindful of the impact this issue has
on the events, such as tournaments, that generate the revenue for
athletes in the United States.134  When foreign athletes compete in
the U.S., the IRS must focus on the tax liabilities that arise from
128. See id. (raising issue of inconsistency by court in methodologies used).
129. See id. (quoting issue raised by commentator).
130. See WithumSmith Brown, CPAs, Tax Court Settles Case Involving Professional
Golfer; Offers Lesson in Sourcing of Endorsement Income, DOUBLE TAXATION: A TAKE ON
ALL THINGS TAXES (Jun. 11, 2011), http://double-taxation.com/2011/06/10/tax-
court-settles-case-involving-professional-golfer-offers-lesson-in-sourcing-of-endorse-
ment-income/ (quoting commentator).
131. See id. (elaborating on uncertainty proposed by commentator).
132. See Nitti, supra note 49 (discussing issues raised by commentator with R
court’s decision).
133. See id. (speculating on areas of possible inconsistencies in future deci-
sions related to court’s decision).
134. See Stephen Taylor, “Are You Not Entertained?  Is This Not Why You Are
Here?” U.S. Taxation of Foreign Athletes and Entertainers, 16 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
375, 400-04 (2009) (discussing impacts of taxing nonresident alien professional
athletes and discussing need to balance competing interests).
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such activities and collect the proper amount.135  However, the U.S.
must be sure to avoid obstructing the flow of talent into the country
with deterrent tax impacts on foreign athletes.136  Therefore, in the
context of the issue at hand, the goal must be a tax regime that
adequately balances collecting taxes on endorsement income
earned in the United States with maintaining incentives for the flow
of talent into the United States.137
B. Implications of Morality Clauses, Tournament
Requirements, and Bonuses
Morals or morality clauses, also known as public image or
good-conduct clauses, are provisions in an endorsement contract
that grant the endorsee the right to terminate the agreement in the
event that the endorsed does something to damage his or her own
image.138  Similarly, stemming from instances of unethical, im-
moral, or criminal behavior from endorsers, reverse-morality
clauses have emerged to allow the endorsed to terminate an en-
dorsement contract to protect the reputation of the endorsee.139
As these provisions have become commonplace in endorsement
deals, the need to carefully craft and negotiate such provisions has
increased.140  After the court’s opinion in Goosen, endorsed athletes
must recognize the implications of such provisions for the purposes
of characterizing endorsement income.141
The court noted that the petitioner’s endorsement deals “even
included a morals clause . . . to terminate the agreements if peti-
135. See id. at 375 (“This focus exists because the IRS wants its portion of the
performance income foreigners earn while in the United States.”).
136. See id. at 404-05 (“The United States must be careful not to hinder the
talent flow onto its shores by burdening artists and athletes with tax consequences.
These burdens, which may not exist in the current tax code, may nonetheless exist
as misperceptions that have significant deterrent effects on foreign entertainers
and artists.”).
137. See id. at 405 (stating need to balance competing interests).
138. See Daniel Auerbach, Morals Clauses as Corporate Protection in Athlete En-
dorsement Contracts, 3 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 (2005) (explain-
ing concept of morals clauses).
139. See Porcher L. Taylor, III, Fernando M. Pinguelo & Timothy D. Cedrone,
The Reverse-Morals Clause: The Unique Way to Save Talent’s Reputation and Money in a
New Era of Corporate Crimes and Scandals, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 65, 66 (2010)
(describing emergence of reverse morals clauses in endorsement contracts).
140. See generally Fernando M. Pinguelo & Timothy D. Cedrone, Morals? Who
Cares About Morals?  An Examination of Morals Clauses in Talent Contracts and What
Talent Needs to Know, 19 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 347 (2009) (setting forth
various negotiation points and effects of morals clauses in endorsement contracts
for athletes).
141. See Goosen v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 547, 553-61 (2011) (noting peti-
tioner’s morals clauses in various endorsement deals and their impact).
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tioner compromised his image.”142  In doing so, it took the pres-
ence of such morals clauses as evidence that bolstered the
argument that such agreements were for royalties.143  This is be-
cause, through the lens of Tiger Woods’ rise (and subsequent fall)
in brand and image, the court believes morals clauses exist to pro-
tect endorsers in case the image they licensed (and paid royalties
on) gets damaged.144  Moving forward, although the inclusion or
exclusion of a morals clause will never be outcome-determinative in
such a characterization of income, this type of recognition by the
judiciary is noteworthy; morals clauses should reasonably be in-
cluded or omitted based on the type of endorsement and desired
tax treatment, as they demonstrate the intent of the sponsors and
the athlete when at trial.145
Additionally, the court’s opinion lends itself to drawing conclu-
sions from the presence of tournament requirements in endorse-
ment contracts.146  The court notes that in Goosen’s endorsement
deals with sponsors, he is required to attend specific promotional
events and play in a specified number of tournaments per year.147
If he fails to do so, sponsors will prorate Goosen’s endorsement
fees.148  The court concluded that such requirements support the
presence of a personal services element to the deal—similar to the
sponsors’ valuation of Goosen’s play at tournaments.149  The court
extended similar logic to the issue of ranking bonuses for success in
play, finding that sponsors value such success.150  As the court con-
cluded, these types of events are not de minimis or ancillary to the
licensing of his image, but rather the endorsement contracts in-
cluded both royalty and personal services income.151  As a result,
practitioners and athletes must recognize that such play require-
142. See id. at 561 (quoting opinion of court).
143. See id. (reasoning that morals clauses support petitioner’s characteriza-
tion of endorsement income as royalties-based).
144. See id. (explaining morals clauses exist to protect endorser from damage
to endorsee’s image).
145. See id. (finding morals clauses lay foundation for characterization of en-
dorsement income as royalties income); see also Ark. State Police Ass’n v. Comm’r,
282 F.3d 556, 560 (8th Cir. 2002).
146. See Goosen, 136 T.C. at 562 (summarizing analysis of court).
147. See id. (describing facts court notes in opinion).
148. See id. (stating conditions of endorsement contract).
149. See id. (noting court’s conclusion that tournament or play requirements
lends itself to personal services income characterization).
150. See id. (extending tournament requirement argument to ranking
bonuses).
151. See Goosen, 136 T.C. at 562 (concluding both types of income present due
to varying conditions of endorsement contracts).
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ments and performance incentives will be characterized in-part as
personal services income, and must structure future endorsements
accordingly.152
C. 2012 London Olympics, UK Tax Amendments, and The
Olympic Tax Elimination Act
In summer 2012, London hosted the Games of the XXX Olym-
piad (the “Games”).153  The Games attracted more than 180,000
spectators and 8.8 million tickets were available for them.154  Ap-
proximately 10,500 athletes from 204 countries took part in the
Games, which had twenty-six sports, featuring thirty-nine disci-
plines, and took place across thirty-four venues.155  In anticipation
of this event, the United Kingdom amended its tax code to serve
the interests of participating international athletes.156
In recent years, athletes have been apprehensive of competing
in the United Kingdom, as it forced them to submit to a tax system
that many considered unfavorable.157  Foreign sports stars compet-
ing in Britain are taxed fifty percent on their appearance fee and
on a proportion of their worldwide sponsorship income.158  Unlike
when athletes were taxed based on how many days they competed
in Britain, HM Revenue & Customs now bases taxation on the pro-
portion of an athlete’s competitions that take place in Britain.159
152. See id. (summarizing provisions of endorsement contracts analyzed spe-
cifically by court’s opinion).
153. See London beats Paris to 2012 Games, BBCSPORT (Jul. 6, 2005),  http://
news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/front_page/4655555.stm (announcing host of 2012
Olympics).
154. See OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF OLYMPIC MOVEMENT, LONDON 2012 http://www.
olympic.org/london-2012-summer-olympics (last visited Oct. 24, 2012) (summariz-
ing notable aspects of games).
155. See id. (describing makeup of athletes and countries represented at 2012
Olympic Games).
156. See Tax Exemption Regulations for 2012 Games, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS,
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/2012games/tax-exemption-regs.htm (last visited Oct. 24,
2012) (stating special tax policies for competitors of 2012 London Olympic
Games).
157. See Kelly Phillips Erb, Nadal Declines to Play in UK Tourney, Citing Tax
Laws, FORBES (Oct. 14, 2011),  http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/
2011/10/14/nadal-declines-to-play-in-uk-tourney-citing-tax-laws/ (summarizing
Rafael Nadal’s decision to skip tennis tournament due to possible tax conse-
quences of playing); see also Simon Hart, London 2012 Olympics: Usain Bolt set to shun
Britain over punitive tax rules, THE TELEGRAPH (Jul. 12, 2010), available at http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/othersports/athletics/7884142/London-2012-Olym-
pics-Usain-Bolt-set-to-shun-Britain-over-punitive-tax-rules.html (describing Usain
Bolt’s decision not to run in Britain until Olympics because of punitive tax rule).
158. See Hart, supra note 157 (describing UK tax policy as it applies to foreign
athletes).
159. See id. (describing pervious UK tax policy).
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This procedure evolved from HM Revenue & Customs successful
2006 challenge of Andre Agassi, in which it argued that in addition
to his prize earnings, a proportion of his worldwide sponsorship was
also earned during his time in the UK, and therefore taxable.160
Subsequently, the Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs revised
their tax policies in anticipation of their potential impact on ath-
lete’s participation in the Olympics.161  Specifically, it passed regu-
lations providing exemptions for certain individuals temporarily in
the UK on Games-related business.162  HM Revenue & Customs pro-
vided the following guidance:
The Regulations implement tax commitments made by
the UK in bidding to host the Olympic and Paralympic
Games (“the Games”).  The Regulations exempt from in-
come tax the activity of specified individuals who come to
the UK temporarily to take part in or assist in the hosting
of the Games.  They also prevent the work of such individ-
uals, where relevant, from creating a permanent establish-
ment of their employer, if one does not already exist, for
corporation tax purposes.163
As a result, athletes would not be subject to a steep UK tax rate for
competing in the London Olympics.164  However, the likelihood of
professional athletes missing events in the United Kingdom for tax
reasons remains uncertain, as such regulations only applied to the
Olympics.
Similarly, in the United States, tax debate increased approach-
ing the Olympics as the topic of Olympic athletes being taxed on
their medals and earnings was raised.165  In response, Senator
160. See id. (summarizing evolution of policy based on successful challenge of
Andre Agassi’s income).  For example, if Bolt were to take part in ten meetings
worldwide, with one in the UK, the HMRC could tax him on one-tenth of his
worldwide earnings. See id. (offering illustration of UK tax policies).
161. For a discussion on athletes hesitation to compete in the United King-
dom, see supra note 157. R
162. See TAX EXEMPTION REGULATIONS FOR 2012 GAMES, supra note 156 (not- R
ing impact of specific provisions of policy passed for Olympic Games).
163. See Explanatory Memorandum To The London Olympic Games And Paralympic
Games Tax Regulations 2010, 2010 No. 913 (2010), available at http://www.legisla-
tion.gov.uk/uksi/2010/2913/pdfs/uksiem_20102913_en.pdf (quoting HM Reve-
nue & Customs); see also TAX EXEMPTION REGULATIONS FOR 2012 GAMES, supra note
156 (setting forth polices of governing tax body of UK). R
164. See Explanatory Memorandum To The London Olympic Games And Paralympic
Games Tax Regulations 2010, supra note 163 (characterizing impact of regulations R
on Olympic competitors).
165. See Meredith Bennett-Smith, Olympians Could Owe The IRS Thousands In Taxes
On Medals, Cash Bonuses, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.huffington
21
Stern: The IRS' Double-Bogey: Goosen v. Commissioner Remains a Fairway t
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-2\VLS209.txt unknown Seq: 22 14-JUN-13 14:46
626 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20: p. 605
Marco Rubio introduced a bill that aimed to exempt such income
from U.S. taxation.166  President Barack Obama, in an attempt to
support American athletes, favored the bill.167  However, some
speculated that US Olympic Athletes might not be subject to any
taxes after taking applicable deductions, and commented that such
legislation unnecessarily complicates the system.168 As interna-
tional sporting events grow in popularity and as the world increas-
ingly becomes interconnected, issues related to the taxation of
international athletes likely will continue to arise.169
VI. GARCIA V. COMMISSIONER170
Sergio Garcia, a resident of Switzerland, is a nonresident of the
United States for tax purposes and a worldwide professional
golfer.171  In 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2008, Garcia was ranked
as one of the top seven golfers in the world.172  However, in March
of 2010, Sergio Garcia received a Notice of Deficiency disputing tax
returns for 2003 and 2004.173  In the notice, the Commissioner de-
termined deficiencies in Garcia’s income tax in the amount of
$930,248.00 for 2003, and $789,518.00 for 2004.174  The disputed
amount centered primarily on the determination to increase Gar-
cia’s Schedule C Gross Receipts for the years in question.175  In do-
post.com/2012/08/01/olympians-owe-irs-taxes-medals-cash-bonuses_n_1729486.
html (noting tax consequences of winning Olympic medals).
166. See Press Release, U.S. Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL), Senator Rubio In-
troduces Bill to Eliminate Tax on Olympic Medal Winners (Aug. 1, 2012), available at
http://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=ea518eca-4667-
4771-bee6-3eeda7106aac (summarizing bill introduced by Senator Rubio).
167. See Kelly Phillips Erb, President Obama Supports Tax Exemption for Olympic
Athletes, FORBES (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/
2012/08/06/president-obama-supports-tax-exemption-for-olympic-athletes/ (not-
ing President Barack Obama’s support of Senator Rubio’s bill).
168. See Kelly Phillips Erb, It’s Possible That U.S. Olympic Medalists Won’t Actually
Pay Tax On Winnings, Exempt or Not, FORBES (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2012/08/10/its-possible-that-u-s-olympic-medalists-
wont-actually-pay-tax-on-winnings-exempt-or-not/ (speculating on need for Sena-
tor Rubio’s bill); see also Erb, supra note 167  (revealing author’s belief that grant- R
ing exemption would unnecessarily complicate tax law system).
169. For a discussion summarizing concerns of taxation of international ath-
letes, see supra notes 153 - 168 and accompanying text. R
170. No. 13649-10, 140 T.C. No. 6, 2013 WL 999377 (T.C. Mar. 14, 2013)
171. See Petition at 3, Garcia v. Commissioner, Docket No. 13649-10, U.S. Tax
Court (Jun. 15, 2010), available at http://dontmesswithtaxes.typepad.com/garcia_
tax_court_petition.pdf  (summarizing petitioner’s professional athletic career).
172. See id. (stating petitioner’s worldwide rank).
173. See id. at 2 (describing Notice of Deficiency from IRS).
174. See id. (stating position of IRS in Notice of Deficiency)
175. See id. (characterizing issue of dispute between petitioner Garcia and In-
ternal Revenue Service).
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ing so, his gross receipts would increase by approximately $3.2
million in 2003, and by $3 million in 2004.176
In disputing the Commissioner’s findings, Garcia purported
that “[t]he Commissioner erred by treating all of the TaylorMade
payments to Garcia . . . in 2003 and 2004 as ‘personal service in-
come’ and by failing to treat a portion of the TaylorMade payments
as ‘royalty income.’”177  This position was based upon the endorse-
ment agreement with TaylorMade explicitly allocating a specified
portion of Garcia’s compensation to personal services and a differ-
ent portion to royalties.178  However, the Commissioner deemed
the TaylorMade endorsement income to be “personal services in-
come” in its entirety—rejecting the treatment of such payments in
whole and in part as royalty income.179
On March 14, 2013, the Tax Court issued its findings.180  De-
spite previously finding a 50-50 split between royalty services in-
come in Goosen, it found the same inappropriate for Garcia.181
Additionally, the court found neither Garcia’s nor the IRS’ alloca-
tion between royalty and personal service income accurately re-
flected the motives behind the endorsement agreement.182
Primarily, the court focused on Garcia’s status as a TaylorMade
Global Icon, especially given how important his image is to selling
their products, and found it convincing evidence that the endorse-
ment agreement was more heavily weighted towards image rights
than that of Goosen’s.183  Moreover, the court found it of nominal
importance that Garcia’s agreement required more personal ser-
vices than Goosen’s did, as it found that fewer appearances were
required in practice and testimony supported that the personal ser-
vices element did not constitute a large portion of the contract.184
Further, as Garcia played in fewer professional golf events while us-
176. See id. (summarizing impact IRS’s characterization of income would have
on petitioner).
177. See id. at 8 (stating position of petitioner).
178. See id. (noting facts relevant to position of petitioner and characterizing
and sourcing income in endorsement contracts).
179. See id. (describing IRS’ characterization of all endorsement income as
personal services).
180. See Garcia v. Commissioner, No. 13649-10, 140 T.C. No. 6, 2013 WL
999377 (T.C. Mar. 14, 2013).
181. See id. at 24 (noting ruling in Goosen inappropriate for Garcia).
182. See id. at 28-29 (summarizing court’s opinion that neither party’s alloca-
tion is correct).
183. See id. at 25 (stating importance of Garcia’s image to TaylorMade demon-
strates agreement more heavily weighted towards royalties).
184. See id. at 25-26 (finding little importance in Garcia’s agreement contain-
ing more personal services elements).
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ing endorsed products than Goosen did, the court interpreted this
as strong evidence that Garcia’s agreement was less proportionately
weighted toward personal services.185  Ultimately, the court relied
upon Goosen when acknowledging that the allocation between roy-
alty and personal services income payments is a fact-driven determi-
nation.186  Therefore, in consideration of the circumstances
surrounding Garcia’s endorsement agreement, it found that sixty-
five percent of the endorsement fees Garcia received represented
royalty compensation, and thirty-five percent represented personal
service compensation.187
As a result, Garcia’s tax liability will increase as his personal
services income increases from his original claim of fifteen percent
of his endorsement contract to the court-determined thirty-five per-
cent.188  Nevertheless, the outcome is still a far better result for Gar-
cia than the 100 percent allocation sought by the IRS.189  Moving
forward, the case is considered a victory for professional golfers and
a defeat for the IRS, despite Garcia’s increased tax liability.190  The
IRS has consistently taken the position that worldwide endorsement
income for nonresident alien professional athletes is to be charac-
terized entirely as personal services income, and such a position has
now been defeated twice in both Goosen and Garcia.191  Further, the
decision in Garcia demonstrates that the percentage of endorse-
ment income the Tax Court is willing to characterize as royalty in-
come is increasing.192  Based on such precedent, it appears one
may only expect that the larger a nonresident alien athlete’s name,
the more likely the endorsement fees they receive is for their image
and not their skills.193
185. See id. at 27 (concluding agreement weighted more towards use of Gar-
cia’s image due to less play requirements).
186. See id. at 28 (noting examination of circumstances surrounding agree-
ment required to make allocation).
187. See id. at 28-29 (establishing court’s holding).
188. See Coleman McDowell, Sergio Garcia Must Pay More U.S. Taxes on Endorse-
ments, GOLF.COM (Mar. 15, 2013), http://blogs.golf.com/presstent/2013/03/
sergio-garcia-forced-to-pay-additional-taxes-on-endorsements.html (discussing im-
plications of court’s decision).
189. See id. (comparing ultimate outcome to position of IRS).
190. See id. (characterizing outcome of case).
191. See Tony Nitti, Golfer Sergio Garcia Comes Up Short in Tax Court, But Is The
Decision A Victory For Other Athletes?, FORBES (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/anthonynitti/2013/03/14/golfer-sergia-garcia-comes-up-short-in-tax-
court-but-is-the-decision-a-victory-for-other-athletes/ (summarizing benefits for
professional golfers from decision).
192. See id. (observing trends in allocation by Tax Court).
193. See id. (predicting future outcomes of similar cases based on Garcia and
Goosen).
24
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol20/iss2/9
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-2\VLS209.txt unknown Seq: 25 14-JUN-13 14:46
2013] THE IRS DOUBLE-BOGEY 629
VII. CONCLUSION
The U.S. taxation of nonresident alien professional athletes is
an issue that has arisen frequently as sports have become more
globalized and international endorsement deals have become more
popular.194  National sports icons have evolved into international
megastars, and as a result, multinational companies have reason to
hire such athletes to endorse their products or brand.195  However,
the difficulty in sourcing just how much income is connected to a
specific country, and the type of income it qualifies as has become
far from easy.196
The Tax Court’s decision in Goosen builds upon the earlier ju-
risprudence of characterizing and sourcing athletes’ income while
providing long overdue guidance addressing specific types of en-
dorsement structures.197  Nevertheless, while the court reached an
outcome for Retief Goosen, many subsequent concerns from practi-
tioners required further guidance.198  Many of these concerns ap-
pear to have been addressed in the court’s guidance and decision
in Garcia, as it largely provided a second defeat for the IRS’ posi-
tion.199  Nonetheless, it is important that a balance remains to en-
sure that promoters of domestic sporting events are able to attract
talent, while the IRS is able to allocate and tax the proper amount
of income earned in the United States.200  The issues surrounding
the 2012 London Olympics demonstrate both the deterrent this is-
sue can pose, and serve as a model for avoiding such issues in the
case of larger global sporting events in the future.201  Therefore,
the ultimate goal moving forward must be for the United States to
establish and maintain a more transparent and logical framework
for taxing the endorsement income attributed to the United States
194. For a discussion on instances of tax disputes relating to athletes, see
supra notes 41-71. 110-120, 171-193 and accompanying text. R
195. For a discussion on the development of athlete endorsement deals, see
supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text. R
196. See generally Goosen v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 547 (2011) (examining
each endorsement contract to characterize, source, and effectively connect income
for taxation purposes).
197. For a discussion on relevant jurisprudence leading up to Goosen, see
supra notes 41-76 and accompanying text. R
198. For a discussion summarizing concerns of Goosen decision, see supra
notes 121-137 and accompanying text. R
199. For a discussion summarizing the issues and outcome of Garcia, see supra
notes 170-193 and accompanying text. R
200. See Taylor, supra notes 134-137 (stating need to balance interests of ath- R
letes, promoters, and tax authorities in solution).
201. For a discussion describing tax issues relating to the 2012 London
Olympic Games, see supra notes 153-168 and accompanying text. R
25
Stern: The IRS' Double-Bogey: Goosen v. Commissioner Remains a Fairway t
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-2\VLS209.txt unknown Seq: 26 14-JUN-13 14:46
630 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20: p. 605
and earned by international athletes in a fashion that adequately
collects the owed taxes without impeding the attractiveness of the
country’s sporting leagues, teams, events, or venues.202
Seth William Stern*
202. See Taylor, supra note 134-137 (stressing importance of balancing com- R
peting interests in reaching viable long-term solution for taxing international
athletes).
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Villanova University School of Law; M.B.A. Candidate,
2013, Villanova School of Business; B.A., 2009, Boston University.
26
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol20/iss2/9
